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Abstract 
 
Lifetime tenure maximizes judicial independence by shielding judges from political 
pressures, but it creates problems of its own.  Judges with independence may implement 
their political preferences.  Judges may remain in office after their abilities degrade with 
age.  The U.S. federal system addresses these problems in an indirect way.  When judges’ 
pensions vest, they receive a full salary regardless of whether they work. Judges can 
retire, receive their pension, and obtain paying work elsewhere. This limits some of the 
harmful effects of judicial independence by encouraging judges to vacate their offices 
when they become old, and by causing judges who lack talent, and therefore find their 
work burdensome, to leave office.  We test the benefits and costs of this system using a 
database of federal district judges.  We find that the vesting system causes judges to retire 
as expected, but that higher-quality and wealthier judges are less sensitive to the financial 
incentives of the system; and that some judges appear to time retirement so that the 
president will appoint likeminded judges. 
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1. Introduction 
 Judicial independence is the centerpiece of liberal democracy.  In the United 
States, the founders secured judicial independence by placing the judiciary in a coequal 
branch of government, protecting judicial pay, and providing for lifetime tenure.  
Lifetime tenure was crucial: if judges did not have to depend on the whims of elected 
officials such as the president for their future employment, they would not be afraid to 
rule independently.2 
 But lifetime tenure has a conspicuous disadvantage.  There is the problem of older 
judges staying on at the job, after their skills have eroded.  In theory, the judicial council 
of a circuit can declare a judge disabled, which in turn allows the President to appoint a 
replacement.  However, judicial councils seem reluctant to declare colleagues with whom 
they have worked for years unfit, except in extreme situations (Campbell 2009).3  
Anecdotally, the more typical process is for the Chief Judge to have an informal 
conversation with the judge whose capacity has diminished and try to persuade him or 
her to retire. However, these uncomfortable conversations are unlikely to occur until the 
problem becomes serious (Chase 1972, 193; Darrow 2000, 1085).4  The result is that 
judges are likely to stay on the bench longer than they should. 
Because of advances in longevity, a judge appointed today at the age of 50 can 
expect to live until the age of 80.9, and hence have a potential de facto term of 30.9 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 This is not complete independence.  Sitting judges might still be motivated by the prospect of promotion 
to a higher court or the possibility of resigning and obtaining employment elsewhere in government (former 
judges have been appointed to positions such as the head of the FBI, Attorney General, Solicitor General, 
Secretary of Homeland Security and so on).  
3 The authority for the judicial council comes from the Judicial Council and Disability Act of 1980.  28 
U.S.C. §§ 352-64.  The Seventh Circuit used this authority in 199 to remove Judge Paul Riley of the 
Southern District of Illinois, who had become mentally unfit after five years in office (which meant he was 
unable to retire at full salary under 28 U.S.C. § 372(a).  Cf. U.S. District Judge Paul Riley Will Retire 
From Bench Because of Medical Problems, St. Louis Post Dispatch, November 10, 1999.  
4 Id. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792422
3 
years.5  We do not have comparable figures for the eighteenth century but we know that 
life expectancy at birth was much shorter than it is today—only 56 years for men (Fogel 
2004; 2).  The first twenty Supreme Court justices died at an average age of 69.7.  A 
sample of twenty Supreme Court justices and circuit court judges who died in recent 
years indicates an average age of death of 79.6, a difference of nearly a decade.6 
 This is a problem for several reasons.7  First, if, as appears to be the case, medical 
technology keeps people alive longer but is not as good at preventing the deterioration of 
their mental faculties, then judges with eroded skills will stay in office longer today than 
they did in the past.8  Second, judges whose judicial philosophies or political 
commitments are mainstream when they are appointed may linger in office long after 
those philosophies and commitments lose their respectability.  Many commentators argue 
that presidents should have the option to appoint like-minded judges, which they cannot 
very often if judges stay in office for long periods of time (Crampton & Carrington 
2005). 
 The contrast with private employment is instructive: private employers fire 
employees when their skills degrade.  The founders rejected this approach for judges 
because it would compromise judicial independence.  If politicians enjoy the power to 
fire incompetent judges, they can use that power to fire politically inconvenient judges.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 76 (2011 
ed.), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0102.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 
2010). 
6 Authors’ calculations based on data from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Biographical 
Directory of Federal Judges, available at 
www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/BiographicalDirectoryOfJudges.aspx (last visited Jan. 30, 2010). 
7 As urged by a number of scholars, who believe that Supreme Court justices stay in office for too long.  
See, e.g., Crampton & Carrington (2005); Calabresi & Lindgren (2005).   
8 As suggested anecdotally by Goldstein (2011), which notes that 12 percent of sitting federal district and 
circuit judges are 80 years older, and that the fraction of judges 80 and older has doubled in the last twenty 
years.   
4 
The impeachment power offered a third way, but it has turned out to be too difficult to 
use, and has largely been directed against judges who commit crimes.9 
 Other systems address the problem of judicial independence and competence in 
different ways.  In many states and most foreign countries, judges either receive fixed 
terms or are subject to a retirement age.  These approaches are crude but effective ways 
to remove incompetent judges.  But they are not costless.  If a judge has a single term, 
then a highly competent and experienced judge cannot be retained.  If the judge has a 
renewable term, then she might decide cases so as to please her political masters—
judicial independence is compromised (e.g., Shepherd 2009).  Mandatory retirement also 
deprives the state of judges who are experienced and whose abilities have not yet eroded. 
 The U.S. federal system has evolved an approach for removing incompetent 
judges despite lifetime tenure.  It operates on the carrot principle.  Rather than remove 
judges who reach a certain age, the system indirectly bribes judges to leave office or take 
a reduced workload when they reach a certain age or level of experience.10  When judges 
reach the age of 65, they become subject to the Rule of 80.  Under the Rule of 80, a judge 
receives a full pension—equal to his or her salary—when the judge’s age and the judge’s 
years of experience on the bench equal 80.  For example, a 65-year-old judge with 15 
years on the bench qualifies under the Rule of 80, as does a 70-year-old judge with 10 
years on the bench.11 
 It is important to understand that because a judge receives full pay upon satisfying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Only a handful of federal judges have ever been impeached.  And over the past half century, every one of 
them has been removed for what either was or would have constituted criminal behavior.  See 
Impeachments of Federal Judges (available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html ) (last visited February 5, 2011). 
10 There are also informal means of pressure, as described in Goldstein, supra. 
11 See 28 USC § 371(e)(1). 
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the Rule of 80, the judge has no pecuniary reason to stay in office.  The judge may 
continue to serve, but does not receive any dollars for doing work.  In effect, the judge’s 
salary is reduced to $0.  In addition, a judge who leaves office can earn more money in 
the private sector or simply enjoy leisure with no monetary penalty.  And judges who 
take their pension are exempt from FICA and Medicare payments (in some states, they 
are also exempt from state and city income taxes) (Block 2007; 539).  Thus, the financial 
benefits to leaving active status are considerable for a federal judge. 
 The judge who decides to leave office (“active status”) faces a further choice: to 
remain on senior status with a reduced workload or to resign. A judge on senior status 
usually has a reduced caseload.12  Table 1 summarizes the effects of these choices 
(assuming the Rule of 80 is satisfied). 
 
Table 113 
 Active Judge Senior Judge Resigned 
Salary Full Full Full 
Tax Benefits No Yes Yes 
Private Sector Pay No No Yes 
Accoutrements of 
Power14 
Yes Partial No 
Caseload Full Partial (typically 25 to 
100%) 
None 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See 28 USC § 371(e)(1). The amount of work that the judge chooses to do can matter for two reasons.  
First, only judges who maintain a workload above 25% of the typical load are entitled for extraordinary 
salary increases (that is, increased beyond the cost-of-living increases).  Second, the number of support 
staff a judge is entitled to also depends on his workload (circuits typically have a scale according to which 
staff reductions are a function of workload decreases).   
13 A fully specified table could include at least three additional columns, for resignation, disability and 
involuntary disability.  We only briefly mention these because they do not change our analysis 
meaningfully.  Retirement differs from “resignation” (column 3) in the sense that the judge 
retains some indicia of office—the retired judge retains his chambers and can use the title “Judge” (as a 
resigned judge cannot), and remains bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct (hence no private practice), but 
does not exercise judicial authority and is not allocated any staff. Disability under §372(a) is a form of early 
senior status. The judge who is certified disabled after 5 years on the bench can receive 50% of his salary 
without regard to age, and 100% of salary with 10 years of service, again without regard to age. A disabled 
judge can continue hearing cases, to the extent compatible with the disability. Finally there is involuntary 
disability retirement under §372(b). It is not used often, because §372(a) (or senior status under the Rule of 
80) usually is available for a judge who can be persuaded that the time has come to leave. 	  
14 Office, robe, honorific, etc. 
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Political Effects N/A Creates vacancy (an 
extra spot) 
Creates vacancy (not an 
extra spot) 
 
 The incentives created by this system are more complex than they first appear. A 
judge who seeks to maximize her pecuniary return would resign rather than take senior 
status because resignation permits her to earn income in the private sector.  A judge who 
cares at least a little about money should prefer senior to active status because of the 
considerable financial benefits.  However, that judge’s status will be somewhat reduced.  
At the appeals court level, the judge no longer votes on whether to hear a case en banc 
and generally does not have the right to assign opinions.15  At the district court level, 
there are fewer concrete effects, but there may be a diminishment in status  – others may 
read the choice to take senior status as a sign that the judge has diminished in capacity.16  
Finally, a judge who wants to increase the representation of her party on the bench does 
best by taking senior status (while a same-party president is in office) so that she remains 
on the bench while a new position is created.17  If the judge resigned, the temporary extra 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 A senior judge may still sit en banc if the court rehears a case in which the judge served on the panel. 28 
U.S.C. §46(c). 
16 See Block (2007; 533) (noting the reluctance of some law students to apply to senior judges for 
clerkships).  Along these lines, one of the pieces of advice that one law school provides to law students 
thinking of applying for clerkships is that “The judge's senior status may reduce competition for these 
clerkships.”  See St. Louis University Law School Clerkship Website (available at 
http://law.slu.edu/careers/opportunities/judicial_clerkships.html ).  
17 An intriguing possibility here that is that a judge choosing whether to take senior status might be able to 
negotiate whether or not he wishes to take that status as a function of who is likely to be appointed to 
replace him.  One senior judge explicitly acknowledged that part of his decision as to whether he was going 
to take senior status was a function of who the likely candidates were to replace him.  Of his choice to take 
senior status, he explained: 
This reality required me to decide whether I would defer taking senior status until it was more 
likely that my successor would be of my political persuasion, which would require waiting until 
one of the Democratic Senators had a pick or a Democrat might be elected President 
three years hence. . . . . My decision to take senior status would not therefore be driven by my 
personal political beliefs but rather by the hope that my successor would meet that standard 
of excellence. 
My hope for such a successor was soon realized when the governor’s office told me that the 
governor had two candidates whom he would recommend to the White House to fill my vacancy 
should I take senior status: One was a former law clerk of mine and one of the very best; the other 
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position would not be created. 
 Recall that the purpose of this system is to encourage judges to stop judicial work 
as their ability erodes.  Will it?  Let us compare this system to a baseline system where 
judges work until a mandatory retirement age of 70.  Evaluation of this system is 
straightforward.  It removes judges who would become incompetent after age 70, but it 
also removes judges who would remain competent after age 70 and does not remove 
judges who became incompetent before age 70.  These false positive and false negative 
costs may well be high. 
 By contrast, the current system encourages elderly judges to take senior status or 
to resign but does not compel them to.  It seems to assume that judges will enjoy their 
work most when their abilities are sharp.  As their abilities decline, the burden of work 
will mount, and hence the incentive to quit will increase.  The retirement system removes 
the pecuniary incentive to remain a judge beyond this point (as long as the Rule of 80 is 
satisfied).  The main advantage of this system, compared to mandatory retirement, is that 
judges who remain sharp beyond the age of 70 will be less tempted to resign, and thus 
will continue to contribute to the judicial system—if need be, on a reduced basis.  In 
addition, incompetent judges over 65 who have satisfied the Rule of 80 will be tempted to 
resign. 
 However, the assumption that competence and desire to work as a judge are 
positively correlated might be wrong.  Judges might enjoy their status, or they might 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was also known by me to be extraordinarily well-qualified. I had no trouble “making way” for 
either candidate, and I immediately submitted my letter to the President taking senior status. The 
Governor quickly sent both candidates to Washington, D.C. to be interviewed by the White House 
Counsel’s Office, and one of them, Brian Cogan, now Judge Cogan, soon became my successor. 
Block (2007; 545); cf. Stras & Scott (2007; 470) (describing the deal that was struck on the Ninth Circuit 
where Judge Betty Fletcher took senior status in order for her son, William Fletcher, to be able to get 
confirmation). 
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derive utility from exercising power or influencing policy—and they might do so 
regardless of their declining competence.  Indeed, the mental erosion that ought to 
compel a judge to resign or take senior status might blind her of the need to do so.  
Another cost is that the system gives judges the power to influence the composition of the 
bench.  If a judge resigns or takes senior status, the president appoints a replacement.  If 
the judge does not approve of the politics of the existing president, she may hang on until 
the next; if she does approve of the politics of the existing president, she may be sure to 
resign or take senior status while that president is still in office.  In an unusually clear 
example of this phenomenon, Judge U.W. Clemon wrote in his resignation letter to 
President Obama: “When it became clear to me last spring that Almighty God had 
ordained you as the next president of this great nation, I delayed my retirement so that 
you would appoint my replacement.”18 
 Finally, because the current retirement system exerts influence by pecuniary 
means, its effects on judicial incentives may vary with the wealth or legal skill of judges.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests that some former judges are well-paid arbitrators or law 
firm partners;19 in a number of cases, judges have cited financial considerations as 
reasons to resign.20  Thus, the retirement system may provide less of an incentive to 
wealthy judges to resign or take senior status than to average judges.  It also may be the 
case that outside job options will be more available to the judges who were more 
influential and demonstrated greater legal skill when they were active judges.  On the flip 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Letter from Judge U.W. Clemons to President Barack Obama, January 20, 2009, available at 
http://blog.al.com/bn/2009/01/Resignationletter.pdf.  In a survey of judges asking whether political factors 
influence their decision to take senior status, 81 percent said no, 16 percent said yes, and 3 percent said 
maybe.  Yoon (2005, 528). 
19 Using web searches, we have found information on 22 judges in our dataset who resigned or retired and 
then took what appear to be highly paid jobs at prestigious firms or set up arbitration practices. 
20 See, e.g., Lattman (2007).   
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side, those judges with greater influence and skill may be the ones who enjoyed it more 
and, therefore, might be the least willing to exit via either senior status or resignation.   
 So much for theory.  In this paper, we test some of these ideas by statistically 
examining the retirement decisions of a large dataset of federal district judges.  We find 
both that the system works as advertised—pecuniary incentives to take senior status (but 
not to resign) are effective—and that its incidental costs are real.  Judges do time their 
retirement decisions for political reasons, and wealthy judges are not sensitive to 
pecuniary incentives.  These effects operate differently across types of judges.  Judges 
who work harder and are better at their jobs are less likely to respond to financial and 
political incentives to retire. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 The judicial behavior literature has uncovered evidence that judges decide cases 
in a way that at least partly advances their ideological preferences.  This evidence has led 
scholars to examine whether judges’ political preferences influence other decisions they 
make, including the timing of their retirements.  On this view, judges should try to take 
senior status when a like-minded president holds office and thus will have the 
opportunity to appoint ideologically similar replacement, or when legal or institutional 
changes make it difficult for them to satisfy their political preferences.  Judges are human 
beings as well as political animals, so retirement may be influenced by factors that 
contribute to their well-being—including judicial pay, opportunities for higher pay in the 
private sector, and similar compensation and quality-of-life issues.  Vesting of one’s 
pension through satisfaction of the Rule of 80 should increase the probability of taking 
10 
senior status or resigning. 
Barrow & Zuk (1990) found evidence that district judges time their move to 
senior status in order to open up vacancies for same-party presidents.  Spriggs & 
Wahlbeck (1995) also found evidence for this political Timing Effect; they also found 
evidence that judges take senior status when their pensions vest.  Baker (2000) also found 
some evidence of the political Timing Effect.  However, all three of these papers are 
vulnerable to methodological criticisms.21  More recent work using more appropriate 
models and more control variables has found little evidence of Timing Effects.  This 
work includes Boylan (2004), who instead finds that the introduction of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, which reduced judicial discretion, increased the probability of judicial 
retirement,22 and Yoon (2005, 2006), who instead finds strong evidence for Pension 
Effects. A recent study by Hansford et al. (2010) finds that only judges eligible for 
retirement are influenced by Timing Effects; pre-pension-eligible judges, by contrast, 
hope to be elevated to the circuit court, and so retire if they are too frequently passed 
over, regardless of the political party of the president.23 
 We build on this work in several ways.  First, the previous work does not 
distinguish judges according to their abilities; we examine how judges of different 
abilities respond to the incentives created by the retirement system.  Second, the prior 
work does little to distinguish resignation and senior status, which we also examine.  
Third, we use a new dataset that contains the retirement decisions over the last ten 
years—the older studies use data sets covering different time periods from farther in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For criticisms, see Yoon (2005, 503-05; 2006, 149-150); Boylan (2004, 251). 
22 But because Boylan (2004) tests the effect of the sentencing guidelines by using post 1989 [] as a dummy 
variable, he actually just captures a time-trend which is open to multiple interpretations. 
23 Other studies have examined the retirement decisions of circuit judges and supreme court justices, with 
similarly mixed results; see Lindgren & Stolzenberg (2010). 
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past.    
3. Judicial Ability and Institutional Design 
Given the wide variation in terms of the both the local processes used for 
selecting nominees for judicial positions and the variety of reasons why someone might 
be nominated, there is likely to be variance in the types of lawyers who receive judicial 
appointments.  Some judges are dedicated public servants and exceptional intellects and 
others are purely political appointments.  The lore on judicial behavior suggests three 
broad judicial types. (1) Time-servers are those who see judging as a secure, high-status, 
and well-paying job but not as a source of intellectual enjoyment. (2) Politicians are 
those who see judging as an opportunity to implement their moral and political 
preferences. (3) Intellects are those who derive enjoyment from judging, either because of 
the intellectual challenges or because of the opportunity to do justice. 
We predict that time-servers will be more sensitive to the financial incentives 
created by the judicial retirement system than are politicians and intellects. Politicians 
will be most likely to take advantage of the power to time retirement so as to give a same-
party president the opportunity to appoint a like-minded replacement.  Intellects will be 
insensitive to both types of incentives. 
To test these hypotheses, we need a set of proxies that plausibly separate out the 
judges who enjoy their jobs or are more dedicated to them from the others.  
Publication Rate:  We define Publication Rate as the number of published 
opinions for a judge in 2001 and 2002 divided by the average number of filings per judge 
12 
in that judge’s district (total filings for the district divided by number of judgeships in 
that district).24   
Positive Citations:  We define Positive Citations as the average number of 
positive outside-circuit citations (including federal appellate and trial courts, and state 
courts) to a judge’s published opinions from 2001 and 2002 as tracked by Westlaw.  
Affirmance Rates:  We define the affirmance rates for a judge as the number of 
non-overruled published opinions, including non-appealed opinions, divided by the total 
number of published opinions in 2001 and 2002.25  The normal intuition might be the 
judges with low affirmances are likely to be worse (time servers); after all, they are being 
reversed more.  However, judges have a degree of control over how to explain their 
decisions and can influence the likelihood of reversal (for example, by deciding whether 
to publish an opinion or not--unpublished opinions are much less likely to get reversed).  
Hence, other things equal, a lower affirmance rate might indicate a higher degree of 
engagement; that is, a willingness to take risks.  In prior research looking at the decisions 
of district judges on preliminary motions, we find some results consistent with this 
premise (Choi, Gulati & Posner 2011).  
Term Clerks versus Permanent Clerks: Judges can choose to hire either single 
“term” clerks (short duration clerks, who are usually right out of law school) or multiple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 By published opinions, we mean opinions that are available in the published reports issued by Westlaw.  
Although Westlaw can publish whatever opinions it wants to publish, anecdotal reports suggest that 
Westlaw simply publishes whatever opinions judges choose to designate as published opinions.  In recent 
years, because of the widespread availability of judicial decisions on the electronic databases, and 
particularly the passage of the E-Government Act, the distinction between published and unpublished 
opinions may have become less important.  However, we suspect that the choice to send an opinion for 
inclusion in the print version is still an important one that reveals information about the case in question 
and the judge.  That said, we constrain our database of opinions to roughly the period immediately prior to 
the passage of the E-Government Act in late 2002.  See E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-347, 
116 Stat. 2899, 44 U.S.C. § 101, H.R. 2458/S. 803) (enacted December 17, 2002, with an effective date for 
most provisions of April 17, 2003). 
25 We also collected data on appeal rates for individual judges from Westlaw.  However, the data here are 
particularly noisy because of large variation in particular types of frivolous appeals.  
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term, often “permanent” clerks.  Hiring single term-clerks involves more work for the 
judge because he has to retrain a fresh group of clerks every year.  Judges who are able to 
easily handle their work and enjoy training young lawyers, however, will happily do this 
extra work.  By contrast, the judges who find the job to be difficult and who need clerks 
who can do their work for them (in effect, functioning as a junior judge) will be more 
likely to use a longer-term or permanent clerk.26  We assume that intellects are more 
likely to hire term-clerks (that is, one-year clerks).27 
Clerks from Top Law Schools: Judges have considerable discretion in the 
selection of their law clerks.  Given the high status associated with a federal clerkship, 
federal judges tend to be overwhelmed with applicants.  A judge, in choosing her clerks, 
can hire the best applicants and that is what she would do if she wanted the best team 
possible to assist her.  However, the judge might also choose to give out her clerkships as 
favors to the children of her friends, rewards to students who signal a particular political 
bent, or presents to her alma mater.  One way to examine whether a judge is more likely 
to be using her clerk hiring to satisfy personal preferences rather than improving the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 It has been suggested, along these lines, that the availability of law clerks enables judges with 
diminishing capacities to stay at the job longer than they might otherwise be able to.  Makar (1997); Posner 
(1995; 181).  It stands to reason, therefore, that that particular effect is more likely to operate with the use 
of permanent clerks than with the use of term clerks.  
27 We base this assumption on conversations with federal judges. One district judge told us: “judges who 
pick [long] term clerks are less ambitious and less confident of their own ability (in my view)…. Smartest 
clerks are [short] term clerks. Smart hard working judges, who are ambitious and not dependent on their 
clerks intellectually, want:  smart clerks who might end up in leadership/leading positions in government, 
private practice, the academy, etc.”  Along these lines, other researchers report both the view that short-
term clerks are perceived to be smarter and that the longer term clerks are better able to substitute for the 
judge.  Take the following passage: 
One of our subjects recounted with evident distaste how it had been widely rumored among the 
bar that the decisions and opinions of one of the career-clerks-equipped district judges were the 
product of the clerks rather than the judge.  One of the district judges’ clerks with whom we spoke 
described his co-clerk [a career clerk]. . . as more concerned with “efficiency” and less inclined to 
“discursive discussion” than the other clerks . . . the career clerk was also said to be very good at 
predicting the behavior of his judge. 
Oakley & Thompson (1980; 104).         
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quality of the work being produced is to look at the fraction of a judge’s clerks who have 
attended one of the top fifteen law schools.  We assume that every federal district judge, 
no matter how obscure, can hire a law clerk who finished near the top of her class at a top 
15 law school.  If the judge systematically hires from below the top 15 schools, she is 
probably not very concerned about quality of her work product.  Such a judge, we 
predict, is more likely to respond to inducements such as the Rule of 80 and the prospect 
of furthering policy preferences.  As our measure of the fraction of top law school clerks, 
we compute the fraction of clerks from top law schools for each judge from 1996 to 
2000.28 
We assume that intellect-type judges have higher publication rates, positive 
citations, and single-term clerk rates as well as greater fraction of top law-school clerks.  
We are less clear on the relationship between low affirmance rates and intellect-type 
judges--high numbers of reversals may indicate a problem with a judge’s decisionmaking 
or it may also indicate a judge more willing to take risks with their decisions. 
We also look at variables that help us identify judges who are time-servers or 
politicians, or that otherwise shed light on the incentives created by the judicial 
retirement system. 
Wealth:  Judges who are wealthy should care little about the Rule of 80.  These 
wealthy judges are not there because of the attractive retirement benefits that a federal 
judgeship provides.  And therefore, we predict that wealthier judges should be less 
responsive to this particular inducement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 We are grateful to Daniel Katz for sharing his data on law clerks with us. 
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Politics:  Judges who are of the opposite party from the president may seek to 
stay active longer than they would otherwise.  Once a same party president takes office, 
such judges may then have a discontinuously greater change of leaving active status. 
Climate:  Judges who do not enjoy the business of judging may be more likely to 
leave active status when the opportunity cost of remaining a judge is high.  One 
opportunity cost is the ability to enjoy good weather outside of the judge’s chambers.  We 
assume that this weather effect will have relatively little impact at younger ages, when 
the judge has only recently joined the bench.  After all, the judge would have been aware 
of the weather conditions in her particular location.  However, age can make a cold 
weather climate less attractive.  We predict that as a judge ages, a cold weather climate 
will become increasingly correlated with a greater propensity to leave active status.  
In addition to the above factors, we also look at a number of other demographic 
factors such as race, gender, age, prior occupation (as a judge, prosecutor, private 
practitioner), and whether one attended a top law school.   These are all variables that 
could influence the choice to retire, although it is not clear that these variables would 
necessarily separate out our judges in terms of their susceptibility to the Rule of 80 and 
the opportunity to influence the politics of their successors.  Hence we use these as 
control variables. 
 
4. Dataset 
Our dataset consists of information about the decisionmaking of all of the federal 
district judges who held office in 2001 or 2002 (developed in Choi, Gulati, and Posner 
(2011)).  We focus only on those judges who were not senior for at least part of the time 
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in 2001 or 2002.  This leaves us with 596 initially active district judges.  Most of the 
judges in our sample were appointed in 2000 or earlier (95.5%).  Some were initially 
appointed in 2001 (2.0%) and 2002 (2.5%).  We track our initial set of active judges from 
2000 to 2010.  
Table 2 describes our sample of judges.  The circuit with the most federal district 
judges is the Ninth Circuit (85 judges).  The circuit with the least is the D.C. Circuit (13 
judges).   Of the 596 judges who were initially active in our sample, 55.7% were still 
active at the end of 2010.   We focus in this study on voluntary judicial departures—
either through resignation (2.0% of the sample) or taking senior status (37.8% of the 
sample).   A small number of judges left involuntarily—either through death (2.0%) or 
impeachment (0.2%).   A small fraction of judges were also elevated to a higher court 
(the federal court of appeals) (2.4%).  
The fraction of the sample that departs voluntarily varies in a relatively narrow 
range from 2001 to 2008 (from 8.4% to 11.4%).  In 2009, the year following Barack 
Obama’s election, however, the fraction of the total sample that departs jumps to 16.9% 
(the highest fraction for all sample years).  In 2010, the fraction drops to 6.3% (the 
smallest fraction in all sample years). 
 
5. Tests 
5.1. The Rule of 80 and Judicial Quality 
 For our Rule of 80 test, we define Rule80, a time varying covariate, as equal to 1 
if the judge meets the rule of 80 in the year in question or the next year and 0 otherwise.  
We exclude those judges who leave active status involuntarily (either through death or 
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impeachment).  We also exclude judges who are elevated to a higher court.  We therefore 
test the voluntary decision on the part of district judges either to remain in active status as 
a district judge or to resign or take senior status. 
We tabulate a number of judge characteristics (referred to as the Judge 
Characteristic variables).  The judge characteristics we assess include whether the judge 
is female (Female), black (Black), and of another minority race other than Black (Other 
Race).  We also look at the age (Age) and number of years of federal judicial experience 
(Experience) of the judge in the year in question.  Next, we tabulate whether the judge 
was employed immediately before becoming a federal district judge as a state court judge 
or magistrate (Prior Judge), a prosecutor (Prior Prosecutor), or in private practice (Prior 
Private Practice).  Finally, we look at whether the judge graduated from Harvard, Yale, or 
Stanford Law School (Top School).  Table 3 provides summary statistics on the Judge 
Characteristic variables as well as other independent variables used in the paper’s tests.  
The Appendix provides a description of the variables. 
 For our test, we employ a Cox proportional hazard model.  The dependent 
variable is the number of years (from the start of the study period in 2000) until a judge 
chooses to leave active status.  For judges who remain active at the end of our study time 
period in 2010, the number of survival years is equal to 10 (the number of years from 
2000 to 2010).  For each judge, the dataset contains separate observations for each year 
of survival containing both time-invariant characteristics of the judge (including Female, 
Black, Other Race, Prior Judge, Prior Prosecutor, Prior Private Practice, and Top School) 
and time-varying characteristics (including Age and Experience).  The Cox proportional 
hazard model we estimate is as follows: 
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h(t, X) = h0(t)ex'β 
 
 
In the Cox hazard model, h(t, X) is the hazard rate.  The Cox model is 
semiparametric and does not require us to make assumptions about the baseline hazard 
rate, h0(t).  In the Cox model, X represents the vector of regressors and β is a vector of 
estimated coefficients.  For our first model, we include our Judge Characteristic variables 
as regressors, including Female, Black Other Race, Age, Experience, Prior Judge, Prior 
Prosecutor, Prior Private Practice, and Top School.  We also include the Rule80 variable. 
Model 1 of Table 4 reports the results.   The model reports the hazard ratio for 
each independent variable.  The hazard ratio represents a multiplier relative to the 
baseline hazard rate.  A hazard ratio of more than 1 represents a positive effect on the 
odds of a judge choosing to leave the bench.  Conversely, a hazard ratio of less than 1 
represents a negative effect on these odds.   
We construct two additional models to test whether judges with varying quality 
(along the dimensions we measure) respond differently to the Rule of 80.  In Model 2 of 
Table 4, we include an indicator variable for whether the judge’s Publication Rate is at 
the 75th percentile or lower for our sample judges (Low Publication Rate).  We also 
include an interaction term between Rule80 and Low Publication Rate to assess the 
particular impact of the Rule of 80 on such judges.  In Model 3 of Table 4, we include an 
indicator variable for whether the judge’s Positive Citations is at the 75th percentile or 
lower for our sample judges (Low Positive Citations).  We also include an interaction 
term between Rule80 and Low Positive Citations.  We select the 75th percentile to 
separate out the top 25 percent of judges who are more likely to be “superstar” judges.  
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The judicial behavior literature indicates that superstar judges may have discontinuously 
greater publication and citations numbers compared with non-superstar judges.29  Unlike 
Model 1, we estimate Models 2 and 3 only for those judges still active at the beginning of 
2003 to avoid possible endogeneity problems with Low Publication Rate and Low 
Positive Citations which are both determined based on opinions published in 2001 and 
2002. 
We find that judges respond strongly to incentives created by the Rule of 80.  In 
the three models of Table 4, the hazard ratio on Rule80 is greater than 1 (significant at the 
1% level).  In the year a judge meets the Rule of 80 and the year after, the judge is much 
more likely to take senior status.  The magnitude of the hazard ratio is also large.  In 
Model 1, for example, the hazard ratio for Rule80 is 12.22, indicating that judges who 
have recently qualified for full retirement pay are 1,122% more likely to take senior 
status than the baseline judge hazard rate.  The results provide strong evidence that the 
Rule of 80 does in fact cause judges to withdraw from active status, consistent with Yoon 
(2005, 2006). 
We also find evidence about the relationship between judicial ability and 
retirement.  In Model 2, the hazard ratio on Low Publication Rate is less than 1 and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that less productive judges are generally less 
likely to leave the federal bench (perhaps because of lower opportunity costs).  In 
contrast, the hazard ratio on Rule80 x Low Publication Rate is greater than 1 and 
significant at the 1% level.  The hazard ratio for the sum of Low Publication Rate + 
Rule80 x Low Publication Rate is equal to 2.10 (and significant at the 5% level), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 For discussions of the distributions of citation and publication rates for appellate judges, see, e.g., Choi & 
Gulati (2004); Farber (2005).   
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indicating the Rule of 80 has a particularly strong effect in getting Low Publication Rate 
judges to depart from active status. These results are consistent with the time-server 
model: judges who do not work hard remain in office (rather than taking a higher-paying 
but more challenging private sector job) up until they can make more money and work 
even less hard by taking senior status. 
In Model 3, the hazard ratio on Low Positive Citations is less than 1 and 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that judges with Low Positive Citations (and thus 
lower opinion quality) are less likely to leave the federal bench (perhaps again because of 
lower opportunity costs).  In contrast, the hazard ratio on Rule80 x Low Positive 
Citations is greater than 1 and significant at the 5% level.  The hazard ratio for the sum of 
Low Positive Citations + Rule80 x Low Positive Citations is equal to 1.03 but is not 
significantly different from zero. These results are consistent with but weaker than the 
results for low publication rate. Low-citation judges, like low publication-rate judges, 
remain in office rather than take more challenging private sector jobs, but they are no 
more likely than other judges to retire when the Rule of 80 kicks in. 
In Model 4, we include an indicator variable for whether the judge’s Affirmance 
Rate is at the 75th percentile or lower for our sample judges (Low Affirmance Rate).  As 
with Models 2 and 3, we estimate Models 4 only for those judges still active at the 
beginning of 2003 to avoid possible endogeneity problems with Low Affirmance Rate, 
which is determined based on opinions published in 2001 and 2002.  The hazard ratio on 
judges with low affirmance rates is above 1 (significant at the 10% level).  This suggests 
that Low Affirmance Rate judges are more likely to exit than ordinary judges.  There are 
two possibilities here.  The first is that it may be that being reversed is a particularly 
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unpleasant experience (anecdotally at least, judges do not like being reversed).  It stands 
to reason, then, that judges who find the job less rewarding will be those more likely to 
exit in order to take advantage of other opportunities.  The second possibility is that the 
low affirmance judges are the subset of judges who are more willing to take risks – that 
is, to write the kinds of opinions that advance the law and risk reversal.  These judges 
may well be the better judges and, assuming that the market recognizes this, will be the 
ones with better private sector options.  We find some clues into which of these 
possibilities is at play when we look at the interaction with the Rule80 variable. 
With the interaction between Affirmance Rate and Rule80, we see a hazard ratio 
below 1 (significant at the 5% level), telling us that these low-affirmance judges are less 
likely to be influenced by the Rule of 80. That, in turn, suggests that judges who are 
willing to court reversal more, at the district court level, are of the more engaged type 
(intellects).30  The hazard ratio for the sum of Low Affirmance Rate + Rule80 x Low 
Affirmance Rate is equal to 0.83 but is not significantly different from zero.31 
As for our control variables, in all three models, the hazard ratio for Female is less 
than 1 (ranging in significance from the 5% to 10% levels), indicating that female judges 
are less likely than male judges to leave active status.  The hazard ratio on Female in 
Model 1 indicates that the rate of voluntary departure from active service for female 
judges is 37.9% less than for male judges (holding all other variables constant). One can 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 A possible selection effect may also occur.  Those low affirmance judges who find reversal unpleasant 
may have exited the judiciary prior to reaching the Rule of 80.  Those low affirmance judges who remain 
up to the Rule of 80 may consist of the more risk-taking and engaged judges. 
31 We calculated the average affirmances per appeal for the 2001 to 2002 period for each of our district 
judges based on all appealed cases, including both published and unpublished decisions (termed 
“Affirmances Per Appeal”).  As a robustness test, we re-estimated Model 4 replacing Affirmance Rate with 
Affirmances Per Appeal and Rule 80 x Affirmance Rate with Rule 80 x Affirmances Per Appeal.  
Unreported, the hazard ratios on Affirmances Per Appeal and Rule 80 x Affirmances Per Appeal were not 
significantly different from zero.  
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speculate about this result—perhaps women find the job more interesting or become 
senile later in life, and thus are less likely to find judging burdensome, or perhaps our 
control variables do not fully account for differential opportunity costs—but we do not 
have an explanation. 
In all three models, the hazard ratios for Age and Experience are greater than 1 
(and significant at the 1% level), indicating that judges with greater age and judicial 
experience are more likely to leave active status.  This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that older judges grow tired of judging—either because judging becomes 
more difficult at advanced age (the Age Effect) or because judging becomes more tedious 
with experience (the Boredom Effect). 
We performed a number of robustness tests.  We re-estimated the models in	  Table 
4 with the addition of alternate definitions of Top School,32 an independent variable for 
district court workload,33 an independent variable for the number of judges in the district 
court,34 and squared terms for Age and Experience.35  The ability of senior judges to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 We do not employ a continuous measure of school quality because we conjecture that a discontinuous 
drop exists in school quality.  For example, there is likely a bigger drop in quality between the top 15 law 
schools and then next 15 law schools compared with the drop in quality between the schools ranked 86 to 
100 and the schools ranked 101 to 115.  Instead, we re-estimated the models in Table 4 with an expanded 
definition of Top School encompassing the top 10 schools as ranked by US News in 1987 (Top 10 School).   
Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 4.  The hazard ratios on Top 10 School 
were insignificant in all the models.  We also re-estimated the models in Table 4 with an expanded 
definition of Top School encompassing the top 15 schools as ranked by US News in 1987 (Top 15 School).   
Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 4.  The hazard ratios on Top 15 School 
were insignificant in all the models. 
33 We re-estimated the models in Table 4 with the addition of the number of filings of civil and criminal 
cases per judge for the district court in 2000 (Filings Per Judge) as an independent variable (to proxy for the 
workload facing judges in the specific district court).   Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results 
as in Table 4.  The hazard ratios on Filings Per Judge were insignificant in all the models except for the re-
estimated Model 4 where the hazard ratio for Filings Per Judge was greater than 1 and significant at the 
10% level. 
34 We re-estimated the models in Table 4 with the addition of the number of district judges in the specific 
district court as an independent variable (to test whether the size of the court matters to the retirement 
decision).  Unreported, we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 4 with the following 
differences.  The hazard ratios on Female in the re-estimated Models 2 and 3 were significant at only the 
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avoid cases may depend on district specific rules.  To control for this possibility we 
added district court effects to the models of Table 4.36  We also re-estimated the models 
in Table with errors clustered by judge37 and re-estimated the models in Table 4 using a 
logistic regression on judge-year data with errors clustered by judge.38   We obtained 
qualitatively similar results as in Table 4 in all our robustness tests. 
 
5.2. The Rule of 80 and Other Judicial Characteristics 
We examine a number of other judicial characteristics that may affect how the 
Rule of 80 affects individual judges.  We first divide our sample of judges based on a 
proxy for the engagement a particular judge has with the job of judging.  Our proxy looks 
at whether a judge hires one-term clerks (who typically come from top law schools) or 
uses clerks who stay with the judge for multiple terms.  We assume that judges who use 
one-term clerks are more inclined to expend effort training clerks or, alternatively, do not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10% levels.  The hazard ratios on the number of district judges independent variable were insignificant in 
all the models. 
35 We re-estimated the models in Table 4 with the addition of squared terms for the Age and Experience 
variables to control for possible non-linearities in the relationship of these variables with the decision to 
retire.  Unreported we obtain the same qualitative results for the other independent variables as in Table 4 
with the following differences.  The hazard ratio on Low Publication Rate in the re-estimated Model 2 is 
less than 1 but significant at the 10% level.  The hazard ratio on Low Positive Citations in the re-estimated 
Model 3 is less than 1 but significant at the 5% level.  The hazard ratio on Low Affirmance Rate in the re-
estimated Model 4 is greater than 1 but significant at only the 11.6% level.  In addition, the hazard ratios on 
Age and Age^2 are not significant in any of the models.  The hazard ratio on Experience is greater than 1 
and significant at the 1% level while the hazard ratio on Experience^2 is less than 1 and significant at the 
1% level in all the models.  This indicates that greater experience initially correlates with an increased 
propensity to retire; but at greater levels of experience each additional year of experience correlates with a 
diminishing increase in the propensity to retire. 
36 We re-estimated the models in Table 4 with district court effects.  Unreported, we obtained the same 
qualitative results as in Table 4 with the following differences.  In Model 1, the hazard ratio on Female was 
significant at the 10.6% level, just beyond conventional significance.  In Model 3, the hazard ratio on 
Female was significant at the 10% level.  In Model 4, the hazard ratio on Low Affirmance Rate was not 
significant; the hazard ratio on the Rule 80 x Low Affirmance Rate interaction term was less than 1 and 
significant at the 10% level. 
37 We re-estimated the models in Table 4 with errors clustered by judge.  Unreported, we obtained the same 
qualitative results as in Table 4 with the following differences.  In Model 1, the hazard ratios on Female 
and Experience are significant at only the 10% and 5% levels respectively. 
38 We re-estimated the models in Table 4 using a logit model instead of a Cox model on the judge-year data 
(with robust errors clustered by judge).  Unreported we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 4. 
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rely on clerks as much and thus do not find having inexperienced clerks as costly.   We 
classify a judge as using either one-term or multiple-term clerks (Multiple-Term Clerks) 
by examining each judge’s hiring patterns from 1996 to 2000.39  We use Model 1 of 
Table 4 as our base model and add a variable for Multiple-Term Clerks as well as an 
interaction term between Rule of 80 and Multiple-Term Clerks.  We report the results as 
Model 1 of Table 5. 
We construct a second model to examine whether judges who hire clerks from top 
school differ from other judges.  We divide our sample of judges based on the fraction of 
their clerks that came from a top 15 law school (as assessed from 1996 to 2000).  We 
define a Non-Top School Clerk Judge as a judge who has a fraction of top school clerks 
that is at the 75th percentile or lower for the judges in our sample.   We use Model 1 of 
Table 4 as our base model and add a variable for Non-Top School Clerk as well as an 
interaction term between Rule of 80 and Non-Top School Clerks.  We report the results 
as Model 2 of Table 5. 
We construct a third model to address the possibility that judges with a high net 
worth may not respond to financial incentives to take senior status as much as judges 
with a lower net worth.  We define Large Net Worth as equal to 1 if the judge’s net worth 
is at the 75th percentile or greater for all judges in the sample ($1.18 million) and 0 
otherwise.  We use Model 1 of Table 4 as our base model and add Large Net Worth and 
interaction terms between Large Net Worth and Rule80 and Post-Rule80 to assess 
whether a pre-existing high net worth diminishes the importance of the Rule of 80 in the 
decision by a judge to leave active status.  Model 4 of Table 5 reports the results. 
In Model 1, the hazard ratios for Multiple-Term Clerks and Rule80 x Multiple-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 If a judge has one single-term clerk and one multi-term clerk, we code that as a multi-term clerk judge. 
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Term Clerks are not significantly different from zero.  We find no evidence that a judge’s 
preference for short-term or long-term clerks is correlated with the general decision to 
leave active status and the specific influence of reaching the Rule of 80.  Multiple-Term 
Clerks include judges with both two-year clerks and more permanent clerks.  To test the 
separate importance of permanent clerks, we replace Multiple Term Clerks and Rule80 x 
Multiple Term Clerks with an indicator variable for a judge with permanent clerks 
(Permanent Clerks) and a Rule80 x Permanent Clerks interaction term.40  Unreported, the 
hazard ratios on Permanent Clerks and Rule80 x Permanent Clerks are not significant at 
conventional levels.  The hazard ratio on Rule80 x Permanent Clerks is greater than 1 
(indicating judges with permanent clerks are more likely to retire upon hitting the Rule of 
80) but significant at only the 15.3% level. 
In Model 2, the hazard ratio on Non-Top School Clerks is less than 1 and 
significant at the 10% level, indicating that judges with Non-Top School Clerks are 
generally less likely to leave the federal bench.  In contrast, the hazard ratio on Rule80 x 
Non-Top School Clerks is greater than 1 and significant at the 5% level.  The hazard ratio 
for the sum of Non-Top School Clerks + Rule80 x Non-Top School Clerks is equal to 
1.51 and is significant at the 10% level.  This result is consistent with the Rule of 80 
having a particularly strong effect in getting judges who utilize non-top law school clerks 
to retire.   
Lastly, Model 3 provides evidence for a Wealth Effect: judges with a high net 
worth do not respond as strongly to reaching the Rule of 80.  While the hazard ratio on 
Rule80 (for judges of all wealth levels) is greater than 1 (significant at the 1% level), the 
Rule80 x Large Net Worth interaction term has a hazard ratio below 1 (significant at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Two-year clerks are grouped with one-year clerks in this alternate specification as the base category. 
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10% level).  The hazard ratio for Large Net Worth + Rule80 x Large Net Worth is equal 
to 0.599 (significant at the 5% level).  This indicates that Large Net Worth judges have a 
higher propensity to leave office before they hit the Rule of 80, but a lower propensity to 
take senior status once they hit the Rule of 80 compared with judges with lower net worth 
who reach the Rule of 80.  The Wealth Effect shows the disadvantages of using financial 
carrots to encourage judges to leave office or reduce their caseload.  Rich judges can 
afford to leave office if they do not enjoy it (which is good), but are hard to force out 
when they get old (which is bad).  A selection effect is also possible.  Those high net 
worth judges who stay in office to reach the Rule of 80 are the subset of high net worth 
judges for whom serving as a judge is inherently valuable (hence why these judges did 
not resign earlier despite having the financial resources to do so).  It is not surprising that 
this specific subset of judges will be more inclined to remain judges past the Rule of 80. 	   We performed a number of robustness tests.   We re-estimated Model 3 of Table 5 
with an alternate definition of Large Net Worth and a continuous measure of Net 
Worth.41  We also re-estimated the models in Table 5 with errors clustered by judge42 and 
re-estimated the models in Table 5 using a logistic regression on judge-year	  data	  with	  errors	  clustered	  by	  judge.43	  	  We	  obtained	  qualitatively	  similar	  results	  as	  in	  Table	  5. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 We-re-estimated Model 3 of Table 5 with a definition of Large Net Worth based on a net worth greater 
than the 90th percentile for our sample of district judges ($2.71 million).  Unreported, the hazard ratio on 
Large Net Worth at the 90th percentile is greater than 1 but not significant.  The hazard ratio on the Rule80 
x Large Net Worth at the 90th percentile interaction term is less than 1 and significant at the 1% level.  We 
also re-estimated Model 3 of Table 5 with the log of Net Worth to provide a continuous measure of net 
worth.  Unreported, the hazard ratio on the log of Net Worth is greater than 1 and significant at the 5% 
level.  The hazard ratio on the Rule80 x the Log of Net Worth is less than 1 and significant at the 1% level.  
Consistent with our results in Table 5, the Rule of 80 effect is moderated for judges with a high net worth. 
42 We re-estimated the models in Table 5 with errors clustered by judge.  Unreported, we obtained the same 
qualitative results as in Table 5 with the following difference.  In Model 3, the hazard ratio on Large Net 
Worth is now significant at the 1% level. 
43 We re-estimated the models in Table 5 using a logit model instead of a Cox model on the judge-year data 
(with robust errors clustered by judge).  Unreported we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 5. 
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5.3. Political Timing Effects 
 Federal district judges of the opposite party to the President’s party may seek to 
remain in active status longer than they otherwise would have with a same-party 
President.  By remaining in active status, the judge is able to occupy a seat in the district, 
reducing the number of seats available for the opposite-party President to fill.  Once the 
opposite-party President leaves office and is replaced by a same-party President, a judge 
with political goals should be more inclined to leave office.  We test for such a political 
Timing Effect.    
 For our test, we use the hazard model from Model 1 of Table 4 (with both Judge 
Characteristic variables and the Rule80 variable).  We add Judge Democrat, defined as 
equal to 1 if the judge was appointed by a Democratic President and 0 otherwise.   Model 
1 of Table 6 reports our results.  During the time period of our study from 2000 to 2010, 
the President changed from a Republican (Bush) to a Democrat (Obama) in early 2009.  
We define the variable Obama as equal to 1 if the year in question is either 2009 or 2010 
and 0 otherwise.  We add Obama and an interaction term between Obama and Judge 
Democrat to Model 1 of Table 6.   Model 2 of Table 6 reports the results. 
 In both models of Table 6, the hazard ratio for Judge Democrat is less than 1 
(significant at the 1% level), indicating that Democratic judges are less likely to take 
senior status compared to their Republican counterparts.  Judge Democrats are 30.8% less 
likely to leave active status compared with Republican judges. 
In Model 2, the hazard ratio for Obama is not significant.  In contrast, the hazard 
ratio for Obama x Judge Democrat is greater than 1 (and significant at the 5% level).  
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While Democratic judges are less likely to take senior status prior to Obama, this 
relationship switches once Obama becomes president.  With Obama as president, 
Democratic judges are no longer less likely to leave compared with Republican judges.44  
The hazard ratio for Judge Democrat + Obama x Judge Democrat is equal to 1.182.  Once 
Obama is President, Democrat judges are 18.2% more likely to leave active service 
compared with Republican judges.45  This pattern is consistent with a Timing Effect: 
Democrat judges hold onto their seats while a Republican is President—in hope for a 
shift to a Democrat president, whereupon they resign or take senior status. 
Thus, the results are consistent with the worry that a real cost of the federal 
retirement system is that it enables judges to delay retirement for partisan reasons.   Our 
findings are at odds with those of Yoon (2005, 2006) and Boylan (2004), but consistent 
with those in prior papers such as Barrow and Zuk (19900 and Spriggs and Wahlbeck 
(1995).  A possible explanation for this difference is that our dataset is more recent than 
their datasets, and that the judiciary has become more highly politicized in the last few 
decades.  Yoon’s dataset, in particular, extends for more than a hundred years, and so 
recent trends may be masked.   
We performed two robustness tests.   We re-estimated the models in Table 6 with 
errors clustered by judge46 and re-estimated the models in Table 5 using a logistic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Indeed, those judges we code as "Republican" who depart when Obama is President may not be fully 
aligned with other Republican judges.  We code Kimba Wood, for example, as Republican because Reagan 
appointed her.  But Clinton later nominated Wood for Attorney General, indicating that Wood's views may 
have in fact been more attuned with Democrats.  Wood retired and took senior status on June 1, 2009. 
45 The sum of Judge Democrat and Obama x Judge Democrat is not significant, indicating that we cannot 
rule out the hypothesis that once Obama is President, Democrat and Republican judges have an equal 
propensity to leave active service.   Even equality, nonetheless, is a significant shift from the pre-Obama 
time period in our study when Democrat judges are much less likely to retire compared with Republican 
judges. 
46 We re-estimated the models in Table 6 with errors clustered by judge.  Unreported, we obtained the same 
qualitative results as in Table 6 with the following differences.  In both models, the hazard ratios on Female 
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regression on judge-year data with errors clustered by judge.47  We obtained qualitatively 
similar results as in Table 6. 
 
5.4.  Weather Effects 
 A judge’s decision to leave active status may turn on the geographical location of 
the district in which the judge sits.  In particular, we hypothesize that judges from 
districts with colder weather (and harsher winters) will be more likely to resign or take 
senior status so that they can move to, or spend more time in, warmer climates. 
 For our test, we use the hazard model from Model 1 of Table 4 (with both Judge 
Characteristic variables and the Rule80 variable).  We add Cold Weather, defined as 
equal to 1 if the judge is located in a cold weather district and 0 otherwise.48  Model 1 of 
Table 7 reports our results.  To Model 1 of Table 7, we add an interaction term between 
Age and Cold Weather, reflecting the likely greater sensitivity of elderly people to harsh 
climates.  Model 2 of Table 7 reports the results. 
 In Model 1 of Table 7, the hazard ratio on Cold Weather is not significant.  Cold 
Weather districts in general do not have a significant effect on the propensity of judges to 
leave active status.  This makes sense, since these judges are the ones who chose to take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
is less than 1 and now significant at the 10% level.  The hazard ratios in both models on Experience are 
greater than 1 and now significant at the 1% level.  The hazard ratio in Model 2 on Obama is less than 1 
and now significant at the 1% level.  The hazard ratio in Model 2 on Obama x Judge Democrat is greater 
than 1 and now significant at the 1% level. 
47 We re-estimated the models in Table 6 using a logit model instead of a Cox model on the judge-year data 
(with robust errors clustered by judge).  Unreported we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 6. 
48 We treat the following districts as cold weather districts: C.D. Illinois, D Kansas, D Maine, D Mass, D. 
Alaska, D. Colorado, D. Connecticut, D. Delaware, D. District Columbia, D. Idaho, D. Maryland, D. 
Minnesota, D. Montana, D. Nebraska, D. New Hampshire, D. New Jersey, D. North Dakota, D. Oregon, D. 
Rhode Island, D. South Dakota, D. Utah, D. Vermont, D. Wyoming, E.D. + W.D. Missouri, E.D. Michigan, 
E.D. Missouri, E.D. New York, E.D. Oklahoma, E.D. Pennsylvania, E.D. Texas, E.D. Virginia, E.D. 
Washington, E.D. Wisconsin, ED Tennessee, M.D. Pennsylvania, N.D. Illinois, N.D. Indiana, N.D. Iowa, 
N.D. New York, N.D. Ohio, N.D. Oklahoma, N.D. West Virginia, S.D. Illinois, S.D. Indiana, S.D. Iowa, 
S.D. New York, S.D. Ohio, S.D. West Virginia, W.D. Michigan, W.D. Missouri, W.D. New York, W.D. 
Oklahoma, W.D. Pennsylvania, W.D. Virginia, W.D. Washington, or W.D. Wisconsin. 
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jobs in cold areas in the first place.  In Model 2, the hazard ratio on Cold Weather is less 
than 1 and significant at the 5% level.  In contrast, the interaction term between Age and 
Cold Weather is greater than 1 and significant at the 5% level.  When judges are younger, 
location in a cold weather district is associated with an increased propensity to remain at 
the job as compared with more mild weather districts. When the age of the judge is equal 
to the median age in our sample (56.45 years), then a Cold Weather district corresponds 
with a 42.5% decreased likelihood of departing from active status (and thus an increased 
likelihood of staying on at the job).    Remember, however, that judges under the age of 
65 do not really have much of an option to reduce their workload, unless they resign – 
and, if they do, they do not receive a pension.  The more interesting effects are when the 
judges get older and within the range of eligibility for their pensions. 
When the age of the judge is equal to 70 years, a Cold Weather district 
corresponds with an 18.8% increased likelihood of departing active status.  With greater 
age, continuing as a judge in a cold weather district becomes increasingly less 
attractive—sunny retirement locations beckon seductively.49 
 The lesson is that when assessing a judge’s incentive to resign or take senior 
status, one must take into account all factors that relate to the attractiveness of work and 
the magnitude of opportunity costs.  Work impinges on opportunities to travel or move 
one’s residence; for older judges in colder areas of the countries, this cost may be 
significant. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 In theory, a judge who takes senior status can move from a cold location to a sunnier one.  However, the 
sunny location has to have a need and the Chief Justice has to approve the assignment.  There are examples 
of judges moving, such as Judge Aldisert of the Third Circuit, who moved his chambers to Santa Barbara 
for health reasons.  See Stras & Scott (2007; 453) (noting the large number of cases from outside his circuit 
that Judge Aldisert has appeared on).  While we do not have data on how common such practices are, our 
anecdotal impression is that they are rare.   
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 We performed two robustness tests.   We re-estimated the models in Table 7 with 
errors clustered by judge50 and re-estimated the models in Table 5 using a logistic 
regression on judge-year data with errors clustered by judge.51  We obtained qualitatively 
similar results as in Table 7.  
 
5.5.  Taking Senior Status Versus Resignation 
 Hazard models have a binary structure.  The dependent variable is the number of 
years before an event occurs.  In each year, the event either occurs or does not occur; 
there can be no third possibility.  For that reason, we have treated the event as “voluntary 
departure” even though judges can voluntarily depart in two ways: through resignation 
and through taking senior status. 
 However, there are differences between these two types of departure.  When a 
judge resigns, she leaves the bench and may take a new job as a practicing lawyer 
without losing her pension if she satisfies the Rule of 80.  When a judge takes senior 
status, she stays on the bench.  She may not obtain a new job; instead, she will continue 
to hear cases, albeit her caseload will be reduced.  In addition, she opens up a slot for the 
president to fill, thus increasing (compared to resignation) representation of her party on 
the bench if she takes senior status while a same-party president is in office. 
 To test the differences between resignation and taking senior status, we use a 
multinomial logit model.52  The dependent variable Outcome1 is equal to 0 if the judge 
stays in active service, 1 if the judge takes senior status, and 2 if the judge resigns in any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 We re-estimated the models in Table 7 with errors clustered by judge.  Unreported, we obtained the same 
qualitative results as in Table 7.   
51 We re-estimated the models in Table 7 using a logit model instead of a Cox model on the judge-year data 
(with robust errors clustered by judge).  Unreported we obtained the same qualitative results as in Table 7. 
52 The difference between the two is muddied by the fact that a judge might “retire” in year 1 and then 
subsequently “resign” in year 2 in order to avoid the minimum 25 percent caseload or to enter private 
practice.  We treat these delayed resignations as retirements. 
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given year.  The model is estimated on judge-year data.  Errors are clustered by judge.  
The model is as follows: 
 
Outcome1i  = α  + ß1iFemalei   +  ß2iBlacki  +  ß3iOther Racei 
 +  ß4iAgei   +  ß5iExperiencei   +  ß6iPrior Judgei 
 +  ß7iPrior Prosecutori   +  ß8iPrior Private Practicei 
 +  ß9iTop Schooli   +  ß10iRule80i   +  ß11iLarge Net Worthi 
 +  ß12iRule80 x Large Net Worthi + ß13iJudge Democrati 
 +  ß14iObamai + ß15iObama x Judge Democrati 
 +  ß16iCold Weatheri + ß17iAge x Cold Weatheri   + εi 
 
 Table 8 reports our results.  We saw before that women are less likely to depart 
from active status than men are; we see in Table 7 that women who do depart from active 
status tend to take senior status rather than resign.  A possible reason for this is that 
women enjoy the job of judging more than their male counterparts.  Or it could be that 
they have fewer opportunities in the private sector.   
 Table 8 also complicates our results for age.  The hazard model indicated that 
older judges are more likely to depart from active status than younger judges are.  The 
multinomial logit model suggests that older judges are more likely to take senior status 
than to remain on active status, but they are less likely to resign than to remain on active 
status.  These results suggest that judges who like judging remain in office; when they 
become old, they prefer judging on a reduced caseload to resigning and entering private 
practice or stopping work.  The reason for what we are seeing may be that beyond a 
certain age, these older judges do not have private sector options (or, even if those 
options exist, they do not want them).  Thus, the pension system does not necessarily 
eliminate incompetent judges; it just ensures that their caseloads are reduced. 
 However, there is also evidence for the Boredom Effect.  Those with Prior Judge 
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or Prior Prosecutor experience are more likely to resign than to remain on active status, 
and less likely to take senior status.  Also there is an Opportunity Costs Effect: those with 
Prior Private Practice are more likely to resign, which allows them to go back to private 
practice and earn money, and less likely to take senior status, which does not. 
 Judges who satisfy the Rule of 80 are more likely to take senior status than to 
remain on active status, but they are less likely to resign.  The first result is predictable, 
the second is puzzling.  A judge who resigns receives her full pension, so one would 
expect a judge who satisfies the Rule of 80 to be more likely to resign than to remain on 
active status.  After all, doing no work for full pay seems preferable to doing some work 
for the same pay.  A possible explanation for the result we find may be that there are 
significant status and privilege benefits associated with being a judge.  A judge who is 
old enough to satisfy the Rule of 80 may be too old to obtain (or enjoy) lucrative work in 
the private sector, so she may as well take senior status and retain the title and other 
accoutrements of power. 
 Wealthy judges are more likely to take senior status than to remain on active 
status; they are no more or less likely to resign than to remain on active status.  These 
results weakly support the Wealth Effect: wealthy judges have less incentive to resign so 
as to earn money in the private sector. 
 The Timing Effect exists but only for taking senior status, not for resignation.  
This is consistent with a story about political incentives.  Democratic judges take senior 
status rather than resign so that they continue to exert influence on policy while opening 
up a slot for the president to fill.  Judges who resign do not open an extra vacancy for the 
president to fill; thus, they are more likely influenced by nonpolitical factors such as ill 
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health.   
 Finally, the Cold Weather Effect is important for older judges who choose to 
resign.    Judges who are based in cold climates are more likely to resign as they grow 
older rather than stay in active status.  In contrast, we find no increased propensity to 
become a senior judge for judges based in cold climates as they grow older. 
 
5.6.  Productive and Unproductive Senior Judges 
 Not all judges who choose to become senior are the same.  Some senior judges 
continue at a high level of productivity, sometimes taking on even greater caseloads than 
when they were active judges.  Other senior judges continue to draw their federal pay but 
reduce drastically their workload.53  To assess workload, we collect data from Westlaw 
on each judge’s caseload for the years 2001 to 2009.   For each judge who took senior 
status, we compute the percentage change in their average caseload from their active-
judge to senior-judge years (excluding the year in which she took senior status).    
Panel A of Table 9 provides summary statistics for the senior status judges.  The 
mean (median) drop in workload for a senior judge was 40.1% (51.2%).  A wide 
variation exists in the change in workload.  Senior judges at the 25th percentile dropped 
their workload by 67.7%; senior judges at the 75th percentile dropped their workload by 
only 24.9%. 
 There is an initial puzzle.  If a judge doesn’t like to work, it makes sense for her to 
take senior status and a reduced workload (or to resign).  But if a judge likes to work, 
why would she take senior status with a heavy load rather than remain on active status?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 This wide variation in the caseloads of senior judges was noted by Yoon (2005; 522) who used survey 
data.  Yoon observed that there was significant variation among the caseloads taken by senior district court 
judges; with thirty-five percent carrying loads between twenty-six percent and fifty percent of a full load 
and twenty-three percent reporting that they had a full caseload. 
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The most likely answer is that (1) the judge wants only a modest reduction in her 
caseload; (2) she wants to jettison the more boring cases such as the pro se claims (senior 
judges can choose to avoid certain categories of cases54); (3) she wants the financial 
benefits of senior status; or (4) she wants to open a vacancy for the President to fill. 
 We assess whether the decision to become a low workload senior judge is 
different from the decision to become a high workload senior judge.  We categorize our 
judges based on whether they are at or below the 75th percentile in terms of percentage 
change in average caseload (Small Workload Senior Judge) or above the 75th percentile 
(High Workload Senior Judge).  So a High Workload Senior Judge is a judge who 
reduced her caseload by less than 24.9% (corresponding to the 75th percentile) from their 
average caseload in their active-judge years. 
We estimate a multinomial logit model with the same independent variables as the 
model in Table 8.   For the dependent variable we use Outcome2 defined as equal to 0 if 
the judge stays in active service, 1 if the judge takes senior status with a small decline in 
caseload (High Workload Senior Judge), 2 if the judge takes senior status with a large 
decline in caseload (Small Workload Senior Judge), and 3 if the judge resigns in any 
given year. We assume that when judges choose to take senior status, they also make a 
choice about the workload they expect to take on when they continue as a senior judge.  
The model is estimated on judge-year data.  Errors are clustered by judge.  The model is 
as follows:  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 See Block (2007). 
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Outcome2i  = α  + ß1iFemalei   +  ß2iBlacki  +  ß3iOther Racei 
 +  ß4iAgei   +  ß5iExperiencei   +  ß6iPrior Judgei 
 +  ß7iPrior Prosecutori   +  ß8iPrior Private Practicei 
 +  ß9iTop Schooli   +  ß10iRule80i   +  ß11iLarge Net Worthi 
 +  ß12iRule80 x Large Net Worthi + ß13iJudge Democrati 
 +  ß14iObamai + ß15iObama x Judge Democrati 
 +  ß16iCold Weatheri + ß17iAge x Cold Weatheri   + εi 
 
 
 Panel B of Table 9 reports the results.   The coefficient on Female and Black are 
both negative and significant (at the 10% and 1% levels respectively) for the High 
Workload Senior Judge outcome.  In other words, Female and Black judges are less 
likely to serve as High Workload Senior Judges compared with remaining in active 
service.  Those Black and Female judges who otherwise would be High Workload Senior 
Judges, and thus have both the preference and ability to remain productive, choose to 
remain in active status.  In contrast the coefficients on Female and Black are not 
significantly different from zero for the Low Workload Senior Judge and Resign 
outcomes.  Female and Black judges are no less likely compared with other judges to 
become a Low Workload Senior Judge or to Resign.  For those female judges without the 
preference and ability to remain productive, this finding cuts against the hypothesis we 
had suggested based on earlier findings (where we found that female judges were less 
likely to resign than their male counterparts).  
 The coefficient on Rule80 is not significantly different from zero for the High 
Workload Senior Judge outcome.  In contrast the coefficient on Rule80 is positive and 
significant at the 5% level for the Low Workload Senior Judge outcome.   In other words, 
when a judge satisfies the Rule of 80, she is more likely to become a Low Workload 
Senior Judge compared with remaining in active status.  By contrast, a judge who 
satisfies the Rule of 80 is no more likely to become a High Workload Senior Judge 
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compared with remaining in active status.  Judges who otherwise would be High 
Workload Senior Judges unsurprisingly are not more likely to leave active status at the 
Rule of 80.  These judges are not motivated by the desire to consume more leisure by 
reducing workloads and the timing of their choices to take senior status appear largely 
unrelated to satisfying the Rule of 80.   
 One might wonder whether the judges who are unmotivated by the prospect of a 
lower workload upon reaching the Rule of 80 are instead motivated by the Political 
Timing Effect.  That turns out not to be the case.  The effect of Obama becoming 
president on the relative propensity of Democrat and Republican judges to take senior 
status is driven primarily by judges who decided to become Low Workload Senior 
Judges.  While the coefficient on Judge Democrat is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, the coefficient on Obama x Judge Democrat is positive and significant at the 1% 
level for the Low Workload Senior Judge outcome.   The coefficients on Democrat and 
Obama x Judge Democrat, in contrast, are not significantly different from zero for the 
High Workload Senior Judge outcome.  Democratic judges who otherwise would prefer 
senior status but choose to remain in active status in hopes for a change in the presidency 
may artificially suppress a preference for a lower workload.  Once they do in fact take 
senior status (once Obama becomes president), these judges will give full effect to their 
preference for a low workload. 
 Put simply, the judges with the preference and ability to remain productive not 
only do a great deal of work for free (that is, even after they reach the Rule of 80 and 
could get the same salary for no work or a lot less work), they also happen to be less 
political. These judges are the intellects, who derive utility from judging. 
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6.  Conclusion: Judicial Buyouts? 
 Judges respond to incentives, including financial incentives, just like everyone 
else.  The empirical evidence of their responses to the incentives created by the 
retirement system confirms this claim.  The system seems to be designed to usher out 
elderly judges by offering them no compensation for doing judicial work once they 
satisfy the Rule of 80—and it works as advertised.  But the system has imperfections, as 
we have seen. 
Wealthy judges are less sensitive to these financial incentives than poorer judges 
are, while judges with high opportunity costs are more sensitive to them.  Judges with 
partisan goals can manipulate the timing of their retirement in order to advance those 
goals.  However, some (but not all) of our results suggest reasons for optimism regarding 
the retirement system.  In particular, we see that the time-server judges (as contrasted 
with the intellect-type judges) are highly motivated by the Rule of 80 to leave active 
status.  Roughly speaking, we see this result hold up across three of the four proxies for 
judge type (high citations, high publications, hires clerks primarily from top schools) that 
we used.  The intellect-type judges are relatively unmotivated by the financial and leisure 
inducements of the Rule of 80.  The retirement system, by offering financial incentives 
least attractive to the most talented judges, therefore eliminates a lot of the chaff while 
preserving some of the wheat. 
The current buyout system could be improved.  If we are correct that judges 
segment into different types; and there are some who are more engaged with the job and 
others who are relatively uninterested in the job and are biding time until they can take a 
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cushy retirement, it may make sense to reduce the pension penalty for a judge to leave 
prior to age 65.  At a younger age, there may be a greater range of outside opportunities 
available to an ex-federal judge.  If judges who are bored with the job can leave earlier 
without suffering quite as much of a pension penalty, they may be able to take on 
employment that suits them better and where they could contribute more to society (for 
example, in the private sector or an academic position).  That, in turn, would make it 
possible for someone else, who was perhaps more engaged with the job of judging, to 
take on the judgeship.   
 The current system also assumes that older judges slow down but do not become 
less competent; senior status enables them to work less, while still contributing to the 
judiciary and permitting the President to appoint a replacement who can take up the 
slack.  But if they become incompetent as well as slow, a better system would improve 
the incentive to resign.  For example, judges could be given the choice between 
remaining on active status with a full load or resigning with full pay—and no 
intermediate senior status choice.  Under this system, less talented judges would be 
significantly more likely to leave office. 
 
40 
References 
 
Barrow, D. J., & Zuk, G. 1990.  An institutional analysis of turnover in the lower federal 
courts, 1900-1987.  52  Journal of Politics 457-476. 
 
Boylan, R. T. 2004.  Do the sentencing guidelines influence the retirement decisions of 
federal judges? 33 Journal of Legal Studies  231-253. 
 
Block, Frederic. 2007. Senior Status: An “Active” Senior Judge Corrects Some Common 
Misunderstandings, 92 Cornell Law Review 533-__. 
 
Campbell, Donald. 2009. Should the Rooster Guard the Henhouse: Evaluating the 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 Mississippi College Law Review 381-__. 
 
Chase, Harold William.  1972. Federal Judges: The Appointing Process. [Publisher] 
 
Choi, Stephen J., Mitu Gulati, and Eric A. Posner. 2011. How Well do Measures of 
Judicial Ability Translate to Output? (unpublished draft). 
 
Choi, Stephen J., and Mitu Gulati. 2004.  Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice. 78  
University of Southern California Law Review 23-__. 
 
Crampton, Roger C., and Paul Carrington. 2006. Reforming the Court: Term Limits for 
Justices. Carolina Academic Press.  Durham. North Carolina.    
 
Calabresi, Steven G., and James Lindgren. 2005. Justice for Life: The Case For Supreme 
Court Term Limits, Wall Street Journal, April 10. 
 
Farber, Daniel. 2005. Supreme Court Selection and Measures of Past Judicial 
Performance. 32 Florida State University Law Review 1175-__. 
 
Fogel, Robert William. 2004.  The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700-
2100: Europe, America, and the Third World. 
 
Garrow, David. 2000.  Mental Decrepitude on the U.S. Supreme Court: The Historical 
Case for a 28th Amendment. 67 University of Chicago Law Review 995-1087. 
 
Goldstein, Joseph. 2011. The Oldest Bench Ever, Slate, January 18 
http://www.slate.com/id/2281318/ 
 
Lattman, Pater. 2007. Judge Paul Cassell Resigns, Bemoaning Low Judicial Pay, WSJ 
Law Blog, September 21, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/09/21/judge-paul-
cassell-resigning/. 
 
Makar, Scott. 1997. In Praise of Older Judges: Raise the Retirement Age? LXXI Florida 
Bar Journal 48-__. 
41 
 
Oakley, John Bilyeu, and Robert S. Thompson. 1980. Law Clerks and the Judicial 
Process.  University of California Press. 
 
Posner, Richard A. 1995. Aging and Old Age. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 
Massachusetts. 
 
Shepherd, Joanna. 2009. The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Decisions,  38 J. 
Legal Studies 169-__. 
 
Spriggs, James F., & Wahlbeck, Paul J. 1995. Calling it Quits: Strategic Retirement on 
the Federal Court of Appeals, 1893-1991. 48 Political Research Quarterly 573-597. 
 
Stras, David and Ryan Scott. 2007. Are “Senior” Judges Unconstitutional? 92 Cornell 
Law Review 453-__. 
 
Stolzenberg, Ross and James Lindgren. 2010. Retirement and Death in Office of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices. 47 Demography 269-298.  
 
Yoon, Albert (2005). As you like it: Senior federal judges and the political economy of 
judicial tenure. 2 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 495-550.  
 
Yoon, Albert (2006). Pensions, politics, and judicial tenure: An empirical study of federal 
judges, 1869-2002. 8 American Law and Economics Review 143-180.  
 
Zorn, C. J. W., & Van Winkle, S. R. (2000). A competing risks model of Supreme Court 
vacancies, 1789-1992. 22 Political Behavior 145-166. 
42 
Table 2 
 
Circuit Freq. Percent 
1 28 4.7 
2 59 9.9 
3 53 8.9 
4 50 8.4 
5 70 11.7 
6 61 10.2 
7 46 7.7 
8 39 6.5 
9 85 14.3 
10 34 5.7 
11 58 9.7 
D.C. 13 2.2 
Total 596 100.0 
 
 
 
Judge Status Freq. Percent 
Death 12 2.0 
Resigned 12 2.0 
Senior 225 37.8 
Elevated 14 2.4 
Impeached 1 0.2 
Still Active 332 55.7 
Total 596 100.0 
 
 
Year Departed (if 
Resigned or Took Senior 
Status) Freq. Percent 
2001 25 10.6 
2002 20 8.4 
2003 22 9.3 
2004 20 8.4 
2005 26 11.0 
2006 22 9.3 
2007 20 8.4 
2008 27 11.4 
2009 40 16.9 
2010 15 6.3 
Total 237 100.0 
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Table 3 
 
Variable N Mean p25 Median p75 
Standard 
Deviation 
Female 596 0.225 0 0 0 0.418 
Black 596 0.114 0 0 0 0.318 
Other Race 596 0.057 0 0 0 0.232 
Age2000 596 56.451 51 56 61 7.385 
Experience2000 596 8.156 3 7 12 6.375 
Prior Judge 596 0.435 0 0 1 0.496 
Prior Prosecutor 596 0.091 0 0 0 0.287 
Prior Private Practice 596 0.403 0 0 1 0.491 
Top School 596 0.136 0 0 0 0.343 
Publications Rate 428 0.025 0.005 0.012 0.026 0.036 
Positive Citations 573 1.776 0.750 1.355 2.171 1.934 
Affirmance Rate 573 0.917 0.875 0.952 1.000 0.124 
Multiple-Term Clerks 559 0.798 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.402 
Fraction of Top School Clerks 512 0.380 0.000 0.333 0.667 0.349 
Net Worth ($ mill) 553 1.120 0.280 0.590 1.182 1.971 
Judge Democrat 596 0.532 0 1 1 0.499 
Cold Weather 596 0.485 0 0 1 0.500 
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Table 4: Rule80 and Judge Quality (Cox Proportional Hazards Model) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Female 0.621* 0.595* 0.625* 0.627* 
 (0.138) (0.142) (0.140) (0.141) 
     
Black 0.850 0.848 0.885 0.908 
 (0.240) (0.259) (0.260) (0.267) 
     
Other Race 0.831 0.772 0.762 0.760 
 (0.277) (0.270) (0.267) (0.265) 
     
Age 1.099** 1.127** 1.117** 1.113** 
 (0.0147) (0.0160) (0.0154) (0.0153) 
     
Experience 1.043** 1.050** 1.040** 1.040** 
 (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0117) (0.0116) 
     
Prior Judge 1.432 1.266 1.295 1.345 
 (0.403) (0.399) (0.372) (0.390) 
     
Prior Prosecutor 0.752 0.617 0.750 0.793 
 (0.293) (0.267) (0.294) (0.310) 
     
Prior Priv. Prac. 1.432 1.362 1.369 1.409 
 (0.398) (0.425) (0.387) (0.401) 
     
Top School 1.109 1.047 1.015 1.031 
 (0.219) (0.231) (0.206) (0.209) 
     
Rule80 12.22** 5.220** 6.562** 15.85** 
 (1.792) (1.509) (1.803) (3.603) 
     
Low Pub. Rate  0.562*   
  (0.142)   
     
Rule 80 x Low Pub. Rate  2.845**   
  (0.962)   
     
Low Pos. Cit.   0.494**  
   (0.129)  
     
Rule 80 x Low Pos. Cit.   2.084*  
   (0.676)  
     
Low Aff. Rate    1.539+ 
    (0.385) 
     
Rule 80 x Low Aff. Rate    0.538* 
    (0.159) 
N 4617 3781 3773 3773 
Log Likelihood -1151.1 -1022.7 -1105.3 -1106.4 
Pseudo-R2 0.206 0.201 0.203 0.202 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.  Models 2 through 4 are estimated only for 
those judges who were active at the beginning of 2003 to avoid possible endogeneity issues with Low 
Publication Rate, Low Positive Citation, and Low Affirmance Rate that are defined based on opinions 
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published in 2001 and 2002. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 5: Rule80 and Other Factors (Cox Proportional Hazards Model) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Female 0.621* 0.591* 0.549** 
 (0.142) (0.143) (0.125) 
    
Black 0.813 0.759 0.843 
 (0.238) (0.241) (0.240) 
    
Other Race 0.851 0.857 1.110 
 (0.284) (0.287) (0.365) 
    
Age 1.106** 1.100** 1.139** 
 (0.0152) (0.0158) (0.0177) 
    
Experience 1.039** 1.040** 1.062** 
 (0.0118) (0.0123) (0.0145) 
    
Prior Judge 1.497 1.522 1.738+ 
 (0.431) (0.512) (0.545) 
    
Prior Prosecutor 0.821 0.949 1.237 
 (0.324) (0.406) (0.527) 
    
Prior Private Practice 1.533 1.499 1.644 
 (0.438) (0.497) (0.517) 
    
Top School 1.145 1.115 1.034 
 (0.232) (0.251) (0.213) 
    
Rule80 8.126** 6.198** 14.45** 
 (3.230) (1.925) (2.704) 
    
Multiple-Term Clerks 1.139   
 (0.368)   
    
Rule80 x Multiple-Term Clerks 1.520   
 (0.641)   
    
Non Top School Clerks  0.611+  
  (0.176)  
    
Rule80 x Non Top School Clerks  2.465*  
  (0.875)  
    
Large Net Worth   1.991* 
   (0.542) 
    
Rule80 x Large Net Worth   0.301** 
   (0.0984) 
N 4308 3942 4300 
Log Likelihood -1132.7 -1024.3 -1066.7 
Pseudo-R2 0.203 0.207 0.223 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.   
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 6 Political Party and Obama (Cox Proportional Hazards Model) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Female 0.692 0.707 
 (0.156) (0.160) 
   
Black 1.003 0.994 
 (0.291) (0.288) 
   
Other Race 0.953 0.956 
 (0.318) (0.319) 
   
Age 1.111** 1.109** 
 (0.0156) (0.0157) 
   
Experience 1.029* 1.032* 
 (0.0129) (0.0131) 
   
Prior Judge 1.392 1.347 
 (0.391) (0.379) 
   
Prior Prosecutor 0.706 0.692 
 (0.273) (0.267) 
   
Prior Private Practice 1.406 1.378 
 (0.391) (0.384) 
   
Top School 1.168 1.204 
 (0.232) (0.240) 
   
Rule80 11.69** 11.39** 
 (1.718) (1.681) 
   
Judge Democrat 0.657** 0.543** 
 (0.105) (0.0989) 
   
Obama x Judge Democrat  2.176* 
  (0.731) 
   
Obama  4.13e-13 
  (0.000000995) 
N 4617 4617 
Log Likelihood -1147.5 -1144.4 
Pseudo-R2 0.208 0.211 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 7: Cold Weather (Cox Proportional Hazards Model) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Female 0.619* 0.617* 
 (0.138) (0.137) 
   
Black 0.850 0.861 
 (0.241) (0.243) 
   
Other Race 0.842 0.863 
 (0.282) (0.288) 
   
Age 1.099** 1.075** 
 (0.0147) (0.0184) 
   
Experience 1.044** 1.044** 
 (0.0116) (0.0116) 
   
Prior Judge 1.451 1.679+ 
 (0.412) (0.500) 
   
Prior Prosecutor 0.753 0.928 
 (0.294) (0.373) 
   
Prior Private Practice 1.453 1.622+ 
 (0.410) (0.472) 
   
Top School 1.094 1.089 
 (0.221) (0.220) 
   
Rule80 12.19** 12.07** 
 (1.790) (1.781) 
   
Cold Weather 1.046 0.0280* 
 (0.145) (0.0477) 
   
Age x Cold Weather  1.055* 
  (0.0266) 
N 4617 4617 
Log Likelihood -1151.0 -1148.7 
Pseudo-R2 0.206 0.208 
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 8:  Senior Status Versus Resignation (Multinomial Logit Model) 
 
 1 = Senior 2 = Resign 
Female -0.759* -0.882 
 (0.316) (0.642) 
   
Black 0.122 -0.369 
 (0.367) (1.002) 
   
Other Race 0.186 -0.442 
 (0.414) (1.319) 
   
Age 0.188** -0.148** 
 (0.0413) (0.0385) 
   
Experience 0.0763** 0.0390 
 (0.0194) (0.0794) 
   
Prior Judge 0.562 18.39** 
 (0.396) (2.492) 
   
Prior Prosecutor -0.183 19.16** 
 (0.581) (2.325) 
   
Prior Private Practice 0.556 18.35** 
 (0.393) (2.330) 
   
Top School 0.109 0.355 
 (0.267) (0.943) 
   
Rule80 3.406** -29.00** 
 (0.257) (0.627) 
   
Large Net Worth 0.822* 0.673 
 (0.346) (0.818) 
   
Rule80 x Large Net Worth -1.738** 0.912 
 (0.478) (0.765) 
   
Judge Democrat -0.857** 0.533 
 (0.220) (0.881) 
   
Obama x Judge Democrat 1.498** -1.068 
 (0.461) (1.647) 
   
Obama -0.741* 1.315 
 (0.346) (1.367) 
   
Cold Weather -1.639 -11.03** 
 (3.317) (2.896) 
   
Age x Cold Weather 0.0251 0.163** 
 (0.0499) (0.0463) 
   
Constant -17.62** -16.19 
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 (2.825) (.) 
N  4384 
Log Likelihood  -532.6 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Base category for the multinomial logit is active status.  The model is 
estimated on judge-year data.  Errors are clustered by judge. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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Table 9:  Productive and Unproductive Senior Judges  
 
Panel A 
Variable N Mean p25 Median p75 
Standard 
Deviation 
Pre-Senior Load 142 411.4 314.5 425.8 493.0 155.5 
Post-Senior Load 142 211.2 113.5 192.5 301.3 135.6 
Change in Load 142 -0.401 -0.677 -0.512 -0.249 0.768 
Change in Load is defined as Post-Senior Load minus Pre-Senior Load divided by Pre-Senior Load.  Pre-
Senior Load, Post-Senior Load, and Change in Load are reported only for judges who became senior and 
have a positive load while a senior judge.   
 
 
 
Panel B:  Multinomial Logit Model 
 1 = High 
Workload Senior 
Judge 
2 = Low 
Workload Senior 
Judge 
3 = Resign 
Female -1.769+ -0.643 -0.539 
 (1.006) (0.486) (0.709) 
    
Black -36.15** -0.416 0.0808 
 (0.422) (0.515) (1.015) 
    
Other Race -0.401 -0.00349 -2.403+ 
 (1.047) (0.606) (1.421) 
    
Age 0.167** 0.190** -0.158** 
 (0.0463) (0.0591) (0.0560) 
    
Experience -0.0188 -0.0222 0.00235 
 (0.0485) (0.0349) (0.0445) 
    
Prior Judge 0.516 0.285 18.91** 
 (1.077) (0.755) (2.730) 
    
Prior Prosecutor -35.40** 0.184 20.10** 
 (1.070) (0.881) (2.958) 
    
Prior Private Practice 0.926 0.785 19.05** 
 (1.056) (0.756) (2.686) 
    
Top School 0.226 0.262 -0.267 
 (0.596) (0.451) (0.738) 
    
Rule80 0.235 0.408* -35.62** 
 (0.182) (0.179) (0.669) 
    
Large Net Worth -0.175 -1.047* 0.921 
 (0.503) (0.407) (0.883) 
    
Rule80 x Large Net Worth 0.151 0.0479 -0.868 
 (0.325) (0.291) (0.617) 
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Judge Democrat -0.574 -1.339** -0.237 
 (0.528) (0.360) (0.766) 
    
Obama x Judge Democrat -0.0356 1.529** 0.132 
 (1.352) (0.286) (1.207) 
    
Obama -3.922** -38.72** -0.811 
 (0.998) (0.242) (0.852) 
    
Cold Weather -6.110 -3.521 -8.817+ 
 (3.721) (4.087) (4.868) 
    
Age x Cold Weather 0.0883 0.0531 0.129+ 
 (0.0592) (0.0650) (0.0778) 
    
Constant -12.51** -12.68** -13.54 
 (2.847) (3.590) (.) 
N   4398 
Log Likelihood   -1914.4 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Base category for the multinomial logit is active status.  The model is 
estimated on judge-year data.  Errors are clustered by judge. 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
 
Variable Description 
Female Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is female and 0 if the 
judge is male. 
  
Black Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is black and 0 otherwise. 
  
Other Race Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is Hispanic, Asian, or 
racial minority other than Black and 0 otherwise. 
  
Age2000 Age of the judge in the year 2000. 
  
Age Age of the judge in the year in question. 
  
Experience2000 Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question 
and the year 2000. 
  
Experience Number of years between the year of appointment for the judge in question 
and the year in question. 
  
Prior Judge Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s immediate prior position 
before appointment was as a magistrate judge or a judge in another court 
system and 0 otherwise. 
  
Prior Prosecutor Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s immediate prior position 
before appointment was as a prosecutor and 0 otherwise. 
  
Prior Private Practice Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s immediate prior position 
before appointment was as in private practice and 0 otherwise. 
  
Top School Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question graduated from 
Harvard, Yale, or Stanford Law School and 0 otherwise. 
  
Publication Rate The average number of published opinions in 2001 and 2002 for the judge in 
question as a fraction of the per judge number of filings for the district court 
in which the judge sits. 
  
Low Publication Rate Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s Publication Per Filing is 
at the 75th percentile or lower for our sample judges or 0 otherwise. 
  
Positive Citations The average number of positive citations per opinion published in 2001 and 
2002 for the judge. 
  
Low Positive Citations Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s Positive Citations is at 
the 75th percentile or lower for our sample judges or 0 otherwise. 
  
Affirmance Rate Number of non-overruled published opinions, including non-appealed 
opinions, divided by the total number of published opinions for the judge in 
question in 2001 and 2002. 
  
Low Affirmance Rate Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s Affirmance Rate is at the 
75th percentile or lower for our sample judges or 0 otherwise. 
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Rule80 Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge meets the rule of 80 in the 
year in question or the year after the year in question and 0 otherwise. 
  
Net Worth Net worth of the judge (in millions of dollars)  
  
Large Net Worth Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge’s net worth is at the 75th 
percentile or greater for all judges in the sample ($1.18 million) and 0 
otherwise. 
  
Obama Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the year in question is 2009 or 2010 
and 0 otherwise. 
  
Democrat Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge in question was appointed 
by a Democrat President and 0 otherwise. 
  
Cold Weather Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is located in the C.D. 
Illinois, D Kansas, D Maine, D Mass, D. Alaska, D. Colorado, D. 
Connecticut, D. Delaware, D. District Columbia, D. Idaho, D. Maryland, D. 
Minnesota, D. Montana, D. Nebraska, D. New Hampshire, D. New Jersey, D. 
North Dakota, D. Oregon, D. Rhode Island, D. South Dakota, D. Utah, D. 
Vermont, D. Wyoming, E.D. + W.D. Missouri, E.D. Michigan, E.D. Missouri, 
E.D. New York, E.D. Oklahoma, E.D. Pennsylvania, E.D. Texas, E.D. 
Virginia, E.D. Washington, E.D. Wisconsin, ED Tennessee, M.D. 
Pennsylvania, N.D. Illinois, N.D. Indiana, N.D. Iowa, N.D. New York, N.D. 
Ohio, N.D. Oklahoma, N.D. West Virginia, S.D. Illinois, S.D. Indiana, S.D. 
Iowa, S.D. New York, S.D. Ohio, S.D. West Virginia, W.D. Michigan, W.D. 
Missouri, W.D. New York, W.D. Oklahoma, W.D. Pennsylvania, W.D. 
Virginia, W.D. Washington, or W.D. Wisconsin and 0 otherwise. 
  
President Same Party Indicator variable defined as equal to 1 if the judge is of the same political 
party as the President for the year in question and 0 otherwise. 
  
Salient Fraction of cases published by the judge in 2001 and 2002 that involved 
church and state, campaign finance, federalism, first amendment, and other 
constitutional rights. 
  
Circuit Quality Out-of-circuit citations to majority opinions of appellate judges in circuit 
  
Circuit GHP Distance Distance between the district court judge in question’s political ideology and 
the average Giles, Hettinger & Peppers (2001) score for the circuit court 
judges 
  
Circuit Diversity Equality of Republican and Democratic appellate judges in circuit 
   
 
